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Introduction and Summary: Problems Posed
by the Balance-of-Payments Deficit
1.Doubts 'Regarding Our Competitive Strength
It is something of a paradox that doubt should arise concerning the
competitive strength of a country which, during the two and three-
quarters years ended September 1962, had an export surplus averaging
$5 billion on its foreign merchandise trade, or $7.2 billion including
nonmilitary services. It is still a large surplus if one excludes from
exports close to $2.5billionof goods and services directly paid for by
the United States Government, such as farm products supplied as
economic aid to other countries under our surplus disposal programs.
Nevertheless, doubt has arisen about our competitive strength and,
therewith, about the soundness of our international financial position.
The reason is that, even at these high levels, Our surplus on goods and
nonmilitary services fails to cover our military expenditures abroad,
government aid programs, private long-term investments, and transfers
of personal remittances and pensions. To finance these items, net of
corresponding payments to us, we need at present levels of operations
a surplus on goods and nonmilitary services of something like $8.5
billion each year (Chart 1). The amount required is much greater if,
in addition, it must cover outflows of short-term capital of the magnitude
experienced in 1960 and 1961.
Any shortfall in the surplus on goods and nonmilitary services in
relation to these various expenditures and transfers has to be made up
by sales from our gold stock or additions to foreign dollar balances and
other liquid claims on the United States. It is, in fact, these' latter

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Problems Posed by the Payments Deficit
NOTES TO CHART 1
aFinancedby government grants and capital.
b Less changes in foreign commercial credits to the United States.
Computed as the sum of U.S. gold sales and rise in U.S. liquid liabilities.
d Includes also (starting in March 1961) changes in convertible currency hold-
ings of the U.S. monetary authorities.
NOTE: Government grants and capital are net of debt repayments to the U.S.
Government, including unscheduled receipts of $689 million in 1961 and $547 million
in the first nine months of 1962. If these special receipts are excluded, the aggregate
of the net payments shown on the left side of the chart, upper section, is increased
by some $450 million to a total of $8,650 million, and the deficit on "basic trans-
actions" is correspondingly increased to approximately $1.5 billion (annual aver-
ages). Military expenditures are net of military "cash receipts" (see Appendix Tables
B-i and B-2).
are taken by the Commerce Department as representing the change
in our "net international liquidity," shown in Chart 1, and as measuring
the deficit or surplus in the balance of payments. As will be discussed
later, however, the balance on "basic transactions," also shown in the
chart, or some other combination of the items may provide a more mean-
ingful measure of the deficit or surplus.
Clearly, then, the adequacy of our competitive strength has to be
judged in relation to the size of the burdens to be borne, and corrective
adjustments may take the form either of reducing the size of these
burdens or of increasing the size of the surplus Qn goods and nonmilitary
services. These two magnitudes are, of course, by no means wholly
independent of each other. Looked at very broadly, private foreign
investment and the Government's operations abroad add to the ability
•of other countries to acquire our goods and services. Sometimes the
link is very close—for instance, when foreign aid is directly embodied
in gifts of food or otherwise tied to procurement in the United States.
In such cases a reduction in our expenditures may mean a more or
less equivalent reduction in our receipts.' In other cases, however, the
1Transfersin kind (other than military items supplied as grants-in-aid) are
treated in the United States balance of payments as if the funds were first paid
over to foreign account (i.e., a "payment") and then used to buy from us the exports
in question (i.e., a "receipt"). This treatment has the advantage of covering move-
ments of real resources, and not financial transactions only, but it tends to make the
balance-of-payments impact of the foreign aid program, on the one hand, and our
export earnings, on the other, appear greater than they actually are. The impact
on the balance of payments would not be nil, however, unless the goods supplied
under the aid program consisted exclusively of' things which the beneficiary country
would not otherwise have purchased from the United States.
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connection is remote, as would be true of military expenditures or
private investments in countries which are otherwise well supplied
with dollars. The problem of strengthening the balance of payments
may therefore be thought of as one of increasing receipts or reducing
payments in ways which are not offset by their effects on other balance-
of-payments items but yield a net reduction in the deficit.
A balance-of-payments deficit is not, in itself, proof of competitive
inadequacy. One would need to know more about the causes and
prospects. The longer a deficit continues, however, the more it would
seempoint to some fundamental difficulty, and 1962 has marked
our fifth successive year of substantial deficit. Indeed, some would
stress in this regard that the United States has been in deficit ever
since 1950 except for brief intervals during the Korean war and again
during the Suez crisis.2 That rather overstates the duration of our
problem. The deficits shown in the balance of payments prior to the
Suez crisis were small, on the whole, in relation to our reserves, useful
in strengthening those of other countries (Chaii 2), and not such as to
seem to require urgent collective policies.
After the Suez interlude, the deficits reappeared in much greater
size. On the definition employed by the Commerce Department, they
ranged between $3.5 billion and. $4 billion annually in 1958,. 1959 and
1960 and, though declining to $2.5 billion in 1961 and to an annual
rate of $1.9 billion in the first nine months of 1962, have produced
cumulatively unwelcome effects on our net international reserve
position.
Out of these protracted deficits arises the fear that, at prevailing
rates of exchange, our competitive position is not strong enough to
yield a tolerable balance in our international transactions except perhaps
at a level of domestic economic activity lower than would be consistent
with our other objectives at home and abroad. How much relief a
compression of domestic activity affords to the United States balance
of payments is, moreover, in doubt. Whatever is gained by reducing
imports or releasing resources for export may be offset by adverse
repercussions on the buying power of neighboring countries closely
dependent on the United States market and by the enhanced attraction,
to Americans and others, of investing in Europe and other more rapidly
growing areas.
2SeeTable 1, pp.i2, 13.
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CHART2
Gold Reserves of the United States and Holdings of
Gold and Dollars by Other Countries and
International Agencies
5
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NOTES TO CHART 2
aDatafor end of year or month.
b Figure for end of September 1962 includes $450 million of foreign convertible
currencies.
Includes short-term liabilities to foreigners reported by banks in the United
States and also foreign holdings of U.S. Government long-term securities. The latter
cannot be broken down between "official" and "private," and are here allocated to
the first category on the basis of partial data indicating that the greater part of these
securities are so held.
SouRcE: Federal Reserve Board and U.S. Department of Commerce.
2.The New Balance-of-Payments Constraint
The United States thus finds itself exposed to an unfamiliar and awkward
constraint. Policies with respect to foreign trade, economic assistance
to the less developed countries, military cooperation, and private
foreign investment come under closer scrutiny for their effects on the
balance of payments. Our effort to attune the commercial policies of
the United States and the Common Market seems to be inspired not
only by a desire to benefit by freer trade but perhaps even more by
a concern lest preferential trading arrangements among other countries
add to• the stresses in our international payments position.
Questions arise also with regard to the balance-of-payments effects
of domestic economic policies. Monetary and fiscal policies aimed at
countering recession or at stimulating long-term growth now have to
be framed with an eye to their external as well as their internal reper-
cussions. Conflict has already been experienced between domestic
objectives and the external stability of the dollar. The dollar itself is
no longer immune to speculative attack.
The balance of payments has become, in the words of President
Kennedy, "one of the key factors in our national economic life,"3 and
strengthening the balance of payments has become a major objective
so as to widen the scope for other policy action.
Even if the balance-of-payments deficit were soon to be overcome,
the United .States could scarcely regain the degree of freedom from
external constraint which it had previously known behind the shield
of the dollar shortage. For several decades, foreign countries' demands
for dollars had usually been greater, frequently far greater, than their
current dollar receipts. This disparity did not repose, as many came to
S Message on Balance of Payments and Gold, February 6, 1961.
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believe, on some unyielding structural disequilibrium causing a per-
manent dollar shortage. It derived rather from the extraordinary con-
catenation of misfortunes that befell the world over this period. These
included two world wars with their heavy demands, for supplies from
the United States and a reduction in other countries' export possibilities,
followed in each case by urgent relief and reconstruction needs and
monetary disturbances abroad. In between came the Great Depression,
marked by the shriveling of United States import demand and the
drawing down of American investments abroad, and then the flight of
European capital to the United States as the Second World War
approached.
The dollar thus came to be looked upon as being chronically in
short supply. By the end of World War II, it had acquired a status
scarcely distinguishable from that of gold and indeed, when United
States reserves reached their peak in 1949, was backed by 70 per cent
of the world's monetary gold outside the Soviet Union.4 Now, with the
disappearance of some of the earlier disparities, the shift in the United
States balance of payments to large deficits, the consequent fall in its
gold stocks and rise in its liquid liabilities, and the increased inter-
national mobility of private capital, the United States is concerned not
only about its competitive strength as a world trader but also about
its problems as a world banker.
3.Some Tentative Findings
From the standpoint of our international objectives, the problem posed
by the balance of payments may be regarded as one of increasing our
competitive strength or else reducing the demands made upon it. With
respect to our domestic objectives, the problem may be viewed as one
of achieving greater freedom from external constraint in the pursuit
4Thedollar fulfilled, in postwar international finance, the classical textbook
functions of money. It was the "unit of account" conveniently specified in many
international financial and commercial agreements, even among members of the
Communist bloc. It was a universally acceptable "medium of exchange," and working
balances of dollars were accordingly needed for international settlements. And,
because these advantages were expected to endure, the dollar became a widely
used "standard of deferred payments" and was eagerly sought as a "store of value"
by central banks, commercial banks, business firms, and individuals.
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of economic stability, long-term growth of output, and higher employ-
ment. To the extent that we solve the first problem, we facilitate solu-
tions to the second. And to the extent that we can select and apply
domestic policies in ways which strengthen our international position
rather than impose new strains, we also facilitate solutions to the first
problem.
Some of those who are most skeptical about the first problem or
most impatient about the second have tended to doubt that these
objectives can be reconciled without abandoning the further objective
of maintaining the dollar at its present foreign exchange value. Specu-
lative activity of varying intensity in the foreign exchange and gold
markets has reflected the same doubt. A change could take the form
of a devaluation to a new fixed gold parity—on the doubtful assumption
that other countries would, in fact, be willing to see their currencies
and export prices rise in relation to our own. Or, as a number of students
of monetary problems would prefer, the dollar might be freed from
any fixed ties to gold or other currencies—a panacea to some but
Pandora's box to many others. Reasons for doubting that the United
States will need to follow either of these courses will be offered in the
present essay. Here, by way of a partial summary in advance, it may
be suggested that the more pessimistic views entertained with regard
to the future of the balance of payments and the dollar may need to
be modified for several reasons.
First of all, views on the present position of the United States in
the world economy still seem to be permeated by the experience of
1958 and 1959, when the balance of payments abruptly shifted to a
deficit of alarming proportions. This shift undoubtedly reflected certain
major changes in the conditions of international competition, attribut-
able to developments both at home and abroad, but was greatly accen-
tuated by various circumstances of a more ephemeral nature which,
even now, are not always adequately taken into account.
Second, impressions of a fundamental deficiency in our competitive
power were enlivened by the new element introduced into our inter-
national accounts in 1960 and 1961 with the heavy outflow of liquid
capital and by the fact that, on the Commerce Department's method
of reckoning, these flows were not as clearly distinguished as they might
have been from other more basic factors contributing to the deficit.
The informed observer, with time to study the Commerce Department's
presentation and analysis, had no difficulty in making this distinction.
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Others, including many most concerned about our international position,
were not equally well placed to do so. With the subsidence of these
liquid capital outflows in the first half of 1962—largely a reflection
of the currency difficulties experienced by Canada—the reverse risk
arose that the extent of the basic improvement in the balance of pay-
ments would be exaggerated for a time in public opinion. The pendulum
swung back once more in the second half of the year with renewed
large outflows of liquid funds.
Third, appraisals of the balance of payments sometimes make little
allowance for the time element in adjustments to balance-of-payments
disturbances. A country's strength in international competition is not
to be judged only by its external deficit or surplus, however that may
be measured, but also in relation to the nature and degree of the dis-
turbances experienced and to the rate at which they are offset. Adjust-
ments to such major changes as those which have occurred in the
world economy during the past decade could not be easy and instan-
taneous, especially with the downward rigidity of costs and prices
characteristic of modern industrial societies. In the light of these con-
siderations it deserves to be stressed that the United States has, in fact,
increased its exports of goods and nonmilitary services appreciably
faster than its imports, not only since 1959 but also in relation to their
respective levels at the beginning of the 1950's. These results are sub-
ject to important qualifications, as will be seen, and may be attributable
only in part to specific processes of adjustment, whether policy-deter-
mined or otherwise, set in motion by the disturbances experienced.
They nevertheless seem to point to some significant elements of strength
in our competitive position and, in conjunction with the gradual fruition
of the various corrective measures which have been taken, suggest that
the balance-of-payments problem may be solved without recourse to
extreme measures.
The first of the above points, concerning the combination of cir-
cumstances which produced the large deficits of 1958 and 1959, will
be clarified by the sketch of balance-of-payments developments since
the war given in Chapter II. The second, concerning the role of short-
term capital movements and the problems which they present for
analysis and policy, will be introduced in that chapter and further
considered in Chapter IV. The third point—that is, the disturbances
experienced in the United States balance of payments, the extent to
which they have been offset, and some of the problems and uncer-
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tainties which lie ahead—will be developed in Chapter III and in the
first section of Chapter IV.
Against this background, Chapter IV considers the possibilities
of improving processes of adjustment in the balance of payments. It
suggests that, whatever may be done in this direction, periods of dis-
turbance and strain are to be expected in a rapidly changing world
and that time must be allowed for adjustments to be made in an
orderly manner. The need is therefore seen of enlarging the resout'ces
available to tide over such periods and to prevent strains in confidence
such as those which have troubled the last several years. It is further
suggested that this need may be especially great for the United States
not merely because of its role as the major international reserve center
but also because of certain distinctive features of its economy which
tend to make external adjustments slower than in other countries more
closely integrated into world trade. Because of the special position. of
the United States in these respects, its problems are not to be confused
with the vaguer and less acute questions which have been raised with
regard to the adequacy of international liquidity in general. To meet
its own problems without, however, reducing international liquidity,
the United States may need to aim at achieving not just a balance but
a surplus in its international transactions to be settled by the accumula-
tion of foreign convertible currencies rather than by reductions in the.
gold and dollar assets of other countries.
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